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1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 311 of the Companies Act, 61, 1973 ("the Act"), as amended 
provides: 
"Compromise and arrangement between company, its members and 
creditors-
(1) Where any compromise or arrangement is prop()sed between a 
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company and its creditors or anydass of them or between a company and its 
members or any class of them, the court may, on the application of the 
company or any creditor or member of the company or, in the case of a 
company being wound up, of the liquidator, or if the company is subject to a 
judicial management order, of the judicial manager, order a meeting of the 
creditors or class of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of 
members (as the case may be) to be summonsed in such manner as the 
court may direct. 
Thus Section 311 makes provision for two kinds of schemes - those between 
a company and its creditors and those between a company and its members 
The motivation behind the takeover of a company in financial difficulties is 
most often the assessed loss of the company with its potential tax benefit. 
Other motivations for the takeover of a company in financial difficulties may 
be the acquisition of the assets, goodwill, trademarks, licences and permits of 
the company. All of these benefits may well be forfeited or terminated if the 
company is wound up and the business is bought out of the company. 
Thus it is often essential for a company to negotiate an agreement with its 
members or creditors in order to change an existing set of circumstances 
whilst preserving those qualities that make the company "attractive". 
In many instances, the same results can be achieved by direct agreement 
with the members or creditors as can be achieved via Section 311 of the Act. 
The question thus arises, why use Section 311 at all? 
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The answer in short is that Section 311 provides for a compromise or 
arrangement, once sanctioned by the court in terms of the Section, to be 
binding on all creditors or members of the specific class involved. 
Thus the Section allows the majority of a class of members or creditors to 
bind the minority, provided that the statutory majority set out in Section 311 
(2) is complied with. 
There are three major and distinct advantages to utilising the mechanism 
created by Section 311. Firstly, the acquirer of the company in financial 
difficulty is assured that if other previously unknown creditors appear they too 
will be bound by the sanctioned scheme because of the operation of Section 
311 (2). Thus the risk of the unknown creditors who, but for the application of 
Section 311, could make the acquisition too risky, is removed. 
Secondly, the Section provides the machinery for overcoming the 
impossibility or impracticability of negotiating with large numbers of members 
or creditors in a particular class. 
Thirdly the Section prevents a minority of members or creditors of a particular 
class from holding the majority and the offerer to ransom, thus making the 
entire scheme too expensive. 
The appeal of Section 311 was summarised by Coetzee, J in Ex Parle Lomati 
Landgoed Beherende (Edms) Bpk 1 as follows: 
"The purpose of Section 311 of the Act can be concisely put as being an 
attempted solution of the problem attendant upon attaining an agreement in 
the case of a large number of widely distributed people who must be 
contacted with a view to negotiating the same agreement with each one. 
Section 311 is therefore particularly applicable where it is impossible or 
difficult to approach everybody individually with a view to submission of the 
offer" 
1 1985 (2) SA 517 (W) at 520 
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A clear case having been made out in favour of the utilisation of Section 311 
of the Companies Act, it now remains to discuss the developments in this 
area of law, from the Standard Scheme to the model utilised today and to 
look at the new challenges facing today's hybrid. However, in order to gain 
an appreciation of the present model, it is necessary to look at the history of 
its development and once that has been examined and once the new 
challenges facing it have been discussed, it may be possible to determine 
whether there is a future for schemes of arrangement and offers of 
compromise in terms of Section 311. 
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2. THE HISTORY OF SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT AND OFFERS OF 
COMPROMISE 
Originally, schemes brought under Section 103 of the Companies Act of 1926 
(the predecessor to Section 311) set out a simple scheme whereby a third 
party offered to acquire the claims of creditors by way of cession for a 
consideration that would allow secured and preferent creditors to receive no 
less than they would on a winding up of the company and concurrent 
creditors to receive more than they would on a winding up. 
However, this practise was changed when the court pointed out that the 
scheme was not one between the company and its creditors. 
The next development, invented to cure the problems raised by the courts 
was widely used and became know as the Standard Scheme. 
In terms of the Standard Scheme the offeror made a sum of money available 
to a "receiver" who distributed it as a dividend to the creditors of the company 
in liquidation. In return for the dividend the creditors lost all further rights 
against the company. The claims of the creditors were then ceded or 
deemed to be ceded to the offeror who thereby acquired a loan account 
effectively equal to the company's total existing liability. In order to ensure 
that the scheme was one between the company and its creditors, the claims 
of the creditors were reduced by one cent in the Rand. 
It was also common for the scheme to have been made conditional on the 
offeror gaining control of the company and the liquidation order being set 
aside. 
The reasons for structuring the standard scheme as set out above were the 
following: 
Firstly, the reduction of one cent in the Rand was thought to be necessary to 
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of Section 311 (i.e. to make the scheme 
a genuine compromise or arrangement between the company and its 
creditors). Secondly, the assessed loss was preserved since the reduction of 
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one cent in the Rand only led to an insignificant reduction in the assessed 
loss of the company. The standard scheme seemed to make everyone 
happy. Creditors received their dividend earlier than they would have under a 
standard liquidation; the liquidator was relieved of many of his administrative 
duties such as summoning meetings and drawing accounts; the company 
avoided going into liquidation; the offeror acquired a going concern with all 
its assets at a substantial discount, along with the assessed loss of the 
company with insignificant reductions; and finally, the offeror had peace of 
mind since no previously unknown creditors could emerge at a later stage 
and claim against the company. 
As Berman J put it in the Multi-Bou 2 case: 
"The standard scheme of arrangement incorporating the deeming provisions 
whereunder claims against the company were reduced by one cent in the 
Rand was placed over the years in ever increasing numbers before meetings 
of all classes of creditors of companies being wound up, following the grant of 
orders of Court summoning such meetings to consider accepting or (as 
happened in rare cases) rejecting the standard scheme couched in the form 
of offers to creditors. Indeed, far more often than not nothing but good came 
of this practise, for creditors invariably received a greater dividend upon 
implementation of the scheme than they would otherwise have been paid, the 
third party obtained control over the company with its assessed losses and 
frequently some of, or even all of, its stock and equipment and the company 
was discharged from liquidation." 
Thus the Standard Scheme was used widely and accepted widely by the 
courts for a number of years. The seemingly unobjectionable and apparently 
advantageous practise would probably have continued to the benefit and 
satisfaction of all concerned had the full bench of the Witwatersrand Local 
Division not stepped in and raised the alarm over what it regarded as a fatal 
2 1987 (4) SA 405 (C) at 409 
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defect in the Standard Scheme. 
The case was Ex-parte Kaplan & Others NNO : In re Robin Consolidated 
· Industries Ltd 3 ("the Robin Case"). The Standard Scheme was placed 
before the court and found wanting. The court rejected the Standard 
Scheme since it was purely an arrangement between the offerer and the 
company's creditors which, because it did not satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirement of Section 311 (ie it was not between the company and its 
creditors), left the court with no power to order a meeting to consider any 
arrangement. The court went on to state that this did not mean that a third 
party could not be involved in the arrangement. However, once under a 
proper construction of the contract the third party is the true party to the 
arrangement to the exclusion of one of the others, it can no longer be said to 
be an arrangement between the latter two parties as the privity between the 
company and the creditors or members, which is a vital prerequisite to the 
operation of Section 311, has been destroyed. 
The Court held that when stripped of a large number of ancillary provisions . 
required to put it into operation, the Standard Scheme was no more than an 
acquisition by the offerer of the creditors' claims and as such was a 
compromise between the offerer and the creditors and not one between the 
company and the creditors. 
The court went further and in rejecting the view that the reduction of the 
creditors' claims by one cent in the Rand turned the whole scheme into an 
arrangement between the company and its creditors, stated: 
" ... only after cession are they (creditors' claims) 'deemed' to have been 
reduced by one cent in the Rand. This formulation removes even the excuse 
for this reduction and establishes if anything the position of the company 
firmly on the sidelines ... "4 
3 1987 (3) SA 413 (WLD) 
4 ibid p 425 A-C 
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The Court distinguished between the substance (i.e. the basic content of the 
scheme) and the administrative element (i.e. those conditions devised for the 
effective implementation of the scheme). Administrative conditions were 
ancillary to the basic content and standing alone were meaningless. The 
court held that the substance of the Standard Scheme was the reduction of 
the creditors claims by one cent in the Rand and the provision relating to the 
cession of the reduced claims to a third person for a consideration had 
nothing to do with the implementation of the reduction. The cession caused 
a myriad of ancillary conditions to be included in the Standard Scheme which 
are clearly separable from the reduction part and which clearly constitute an 
arrangement between the creditors and the third party (the offeror) instead of 
the company. 
As a result, the court disregarded the cession part of the scheme leaving only 
the reduction part of the scheme which the court regarded as a useless 
device which could not accomplish anything. 
The full bench of the Cape Provincial Division followed the reasoning of the 
Robin Case in Ex part Millman & Others NNO: In re Multi-Bou (Pty) Ltd. 5{'the 
Multi-Bou case'). 
In this case an attempt was made to counter the defects in the Standard 
Scheme highlighted by the Robin judgement. The offeror was to acquire, by 
way of cession, 99% of each creditor's claim against payment of the sum of 
R1.6 million. The company would, in addition, borrow the sum of R100 000 
from the offeror (on loan account), which amount would then be paid to the 
creditors for the remaining one percent of their claims, and which would then 
extinguish this portion of their claims. 
The proposers of this scheme contended that the company played an 
essential role in the scheme since the consent of the company was required 
for the partial cession (99%) to the offeror of each creditor's claim. Because 
5 1987 (4) SA 405 (CJ 
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the company was the debtor and because in effect a partial cession took 
place, the company (as debtor) had to consent to the partial cession in order 
to give it legal force and effect. 
Berman J, delivering the judgement of the full bench rejected this approach 
and refused to grant the application. He conceded that the consent of the 
debtor is a prerequisite to a valid partial cession, but stated that on a true 
analysis, the purported partial cession was nothing of the kind. As the 
arrangement was dependent on its being sanctioned; it had to be regarded 
not as a single transaction, but as a number of separate transactions which 
were inter-dependent on each other and concluded simultaneously. He went 
on to hold that what was actually being ceded was the entire balance of the 
claim of each creditor and not part of it. Thus the debtor company did not 
have to consent to the cession in order to render it legally binding and 
enforceable and the arrangement was accordingly not one between the 
company and its·creditors. 
The court rejected the Scheme on the grounds that it was a sham, a 
disguised transaction which was structured to give the appearance and 
impression of an arrangement between the company and its creditors when, 
in substance, it was an arrangement between a third party and the creditors. 
However, the full bench of the Durban and Coastal Local Division did not 
follow the Cape Provincial Division or the Witwatersrand Local Division in the 
case of Ex parte Strydom No: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd.; 
Ex parte Spendiff No: In re Candida Footwear manufacturing (Pty) Ltd; Ex 
parte Spendiff No: In re Jerseyside (Pty) Ltd. 6 ("the Natal Case"). The court 
held that the Standard Scheme involved deemed, and not actual, cession of 
the creditors' claims. Deemed cessions required the participation of the 
company since they required that the company recognize a state of affairs 
that did not in fact exist. The court found that the proposed scheme 
6 1998 (1) SA 616 (D) 
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constituted an arrangement between the company· and the creditors within 
the meaning of Section 311. 
The deeming provision, the Court held, required the active participation of the 
company inasmuch as: 
" ... What is required to bring about the situation is agreement on the part of 
the company to regard a third party as its creditor in place of its actual 
creditor, as if the actual creditor had ceded its claim to the third party. This 
concept can only be given any legal effect by the actions of the company in 
recognizing a state of affairs as existing, which does not in fact exist". 7 
The court held that Coetzee DJP had erred in the Robin judgement by 
looking merely at the final effect of the scheme i.e. the acquisition of 
creditors' claims by the offeror and not at the means itself whereby this was 
achieved i.e. the deemed cession. 
The combined effect of the above cases was that whilst the Standard 
Scheme was acceptable for Section 311 purposes in the Durban and Coastal 
Local Division, alternatives had to be sought in the Witwatersrand and the 
Cape. 
The Orange Free State Provincial Division, in the Case of Sackstein NOV 
Boltstone (Free State) (Ply) Ltd. (in liquidation) 8 ("the Boltstone case") 
approved what has become known as the 'Preference Share Scheme'. This 
was developed as an alternative to the Standard Scheme and was approved 
in numerous unreported judgements in the Transvaal and the Cape. The 
Boltstone Case was the first reported judgement on the Preference Share 
Scheme. 
In this type of scheme, the claims of the creditors, reduced by the capital sum 
paid to them by the receiver, would be converted into preferent share capital. 
The creditors would thereafter be deemed to have renounced their 
7 Ibid, at p621 H-1 
8 1998 (4) SA 556 (OPD) 
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entitlement to issue and allotment of the preferent shares, in favour of a 
nominee (usually the offerer) appointed by the Company. 
The creditors' rights were thus limited to the right to claim the dividend paid to 
them from the capital sum. 
The court found that this amounted to an arrangement between the company 
and its creditors since the creditors are directly involved (by agreeing to the 
conversion of their claims into capital and renouncing any entitlement to the 
issue of preference shares) and the Company is directly involved (by passing 
a resolution consenting to the transfer of the issued share capital to the 
nominee). 
Whilst the Preference Share Scheme obviously satisfies the jurisdictional 
requirements of Section 311, there are other considerations which have to be 
examined. The most important of these is the question whether these types 
of schemes, like their predecessor the Standard Scheme are able to preserve 
the assessed loss. In this regard Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act 
is vital and these schemes will be discussed later in this regard. 
Suffice it to say at this stage that there was sufficient doubt in their efficiency 
in this area to cause the proposers of Schemes of arrangements to look for 
other solutions. 
Subordination of Claims 
Another factor which influenced the development of the Standard Scheme 
was highlighted for the first time in the Robin Case, where the court 
expressed concern that the standard scheme allowed the company's 
liabilities to remain intact. Coetzee D J P highlighted what was a major area 
of concern for him in the Robin Case at 426F to 4278: 
"When discharging the winding up order, the court now sends back into the 
business world the same hopelessly insolvent company.to trade and incur 
debts as before. Per se this is not illegal, but a greater potential for harm and 
prejudice to the public than before lurks in the state of affairs. This arises 
from the fact that all the debts are now consolidated in the hands of the 
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controller of the company. Because this enables this person, usually the 
offerer, to play a dominant role in any division of the assets in a future 
(possibly not too distant) winding-up, a new creditor who has supplied goods 
to such a company may find the great bulk of these goods being used to pay 
this big inside creditor/ controller which has now arrived on the scene. In the 
hands of disreputable persons who become new controllers this kind of 
scheme concentrates awesome powers for harm. The public interest, which 
-is clearly a proper consideration in the exercise of the courts' discretion, 
probably demands that, because such results are forseeably possible, this 
kind of scheme, even if otherwise legal, should not be countenanced." 
In an attempt to overcome this problem it was suggested that the 
subordination or back-ranking of the ceded claims in favour of future 
creditors, until such time as the assets of the company exceeded its liabilities, 
would provide a solution to the problem. 
However, Coetzee, DJ P did not regard this as a satisfactory answer to the 
problem and instead suggested the conversion of the ceded claims into new 
capital. 
In the Multi-Bou case this issue was not considered. 
However, in the Natal case the issue of the company continuing to trade in 
insolvent circumstances was fully considered and the court held that it was 
not an area for concern. 
Then followed two cases before Stegmann, J in which the subordination of 
claims was considered and rejected. 
The first of these was Ex Parle de Villiers NO: in re MSL Publications (Pty) 
Ltd. (in liquidation) 9 
In this case six broad requirements were set out as guidelines for whether the 
court should order a meeting to be called. The court held that if it was self-
9 1990 (4) SA 59 (WLD) 
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evident when the first step of seeking leave to summon a meeting was taken, 
that, the proposals were ones which no court could possibly sanction at the 
last phase, the court should not authorise the calling of the meeting at the 
initial stage. 
The main objection which the court had against the proposed scheme was to 
be found on page 86 C - J. 
In essence the court felt that the subordination agreement did not address 
the heart of the problem. The court disagreed with the counsel for the 
applicant where he said that one of the consequences of the subordination 
agreement would be that the insolvent company would no longer be 
insolvent. It felt that the subordination agreement would not reduce the 
company's liabilities. Furthermore the court held that even were the above 
proposition to be correct, mere 'non-insolvency' would not solve the problem -
Quoting from 86 H - J. 
"The root of the problem is that the proposer wishes to use a company that 
has lost its capital as a trading company. In other words, the proposer 
wishes to engage in the risky business of trading; it wishes to use a company 
for that purpose; it wishes to avoid exposing any capital to the relevant risks 
in the manner contemplated by the Companies Act ... and at the same time, 
it wishes to enjoy the benefit of limited liability offered by the Companies Act. 
To put it plainly, it wishes to have its cake and eat it. The answer is that it 
cannot." 
A similar scheme again came before Stegman J, in Ex Parle Lebowa 
Development Corporation Ltd 10• The scheme was again rejected for very 
similar reasons. The court held that if the proposed scheme was sanctioned, 
the company would be free to trade in insolvent circumstances and public 
policy precludes courts from condoning, encouraging or facilitating the 
practice of trading in insolvent circumstances. The court further held that 
10 1989 (3) SA 71 TPD 
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subordination of the creditors claims effected no permanent change to the 
statutory ranking of claims and could be undone at any stage. 
In Cooper v A&G Fashions (Pty) Ltd: Ex Parte Millman NO 11 in the CPO, 
Conradie, J. stated: 
"I respectfully disagree with Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation in 
that a suitably worded subordination agreement can in principal not restore a 
company's solvency. In the present case the subordination agreement 
provides, as such agreements commonly do, that the subordinated debt is 
not to be enforceable until the debtor company's assets exceed its liabilities. 
For as long as the company's balance sheet shows that its liabilities exceed 
its assets the subordinated debt remains a contingent liability. It may be 
enforceable if, for example, the person who acquires the subordinated debt 
is not bound by the subordination agreement and there is no other 
mechanism preventing him from enforcing the subordinated debt. The better 
a subordination provision is drafted and the greater the protection it offers 
future creditors against enforcement of the subordinated debt, the smaller the 
contingency will be that the debtor company may be obliged to pay the 
subordinated debt. A contingent debt is valued according to the prospect of 
its becoming enforceable. In evaluating a debtor's financial position, one 
would not assess the debt at its face value ... for the purpose of determining 
what effect the subordination provision has on the solvency of the company, 
the subordinated debt must be evaluated in the way that contingent liabilities 
are evaluated." 
Furthermore at 208 H - I the court stated: 
"I do not, with respect, agree with Stegmann, J. that sending an insolvent 
company back into the business world is a social evil which a Court should 
not under any circumstances permit." 
Finally, at 209 I, the court held: 
11 1991 (4) SA 204 (C) 
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r, 
"Saying that the court has a discretion to refuse to wind up an insolvent 
company, is the same as saying that it may, in its discretion, permit an 
insolvent company to continue trading". 
The issue again came before Stegmann, Jin Ex Parle De Villiers and 
Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation). 12 
In this judgement, the learned judge set out three major arguments against 
allowing the company to continue doing business. 
The first argument was based on the question of the company's solvency. 
According to the court there exists, over and above the accepted concepts of 
insolvency and 'commercial' insolvency, a 'corruption' of the theory -
At112F: 
"It starts with a premise which inverts the concept of insolvency or sees it as it 
were, through the looking-glass. The concept of commercial insolvency, 
correctly understood is not more than that a company which fails to pay its 
debts currently due may or may not be insolvent and should, for reasons of 
commercial convenience, be treated as if it is insolvent. By inverting that idea 
one may arrive at the corrupt and fallacious proposition, acceptable only in 
world on the other side of the looking-glass, that for as long as a company 
continues to pay its debts as they fall due it is neither commercially insolvent 
(because it has not failed to pay any due debts) nor insolvent in any sense, 
and it is accordingly not liable to be wound up. That proposition conveniently 
overlooks the fact that an insolvent company which continues to pay its debts 
as they fall due may actually be preferring current creditors at the expense of 
creditors whose claims have not yet fallen due. 
The looking-glass world idea that a company which is in fact insolvent can 
demonstrate that it is not by the simple expedient of continuing to pay its 
debts as thay fall due, has gained currency amongst persons whose interest 
12 1992 (2) SA 95 (WLD) 
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it serves. More surprisingly, it seems to have found expression in a 
judgement in the Supreme Court in Natal in which it has been said (in my 
respectful view erroneously) that: 
"from a commercial point of view, however (and this is recognised in the 
Companies Act), the true test of a company's solvency is not whether the 
company's liabilities exceed its assets but whether it is able to pay its debts." 
(See Rosenbach & Co. (Pty) Ltd. v Singh's Bazaars (Pty) Ltd. 1962 (4) SA 
593 (D) at 596F - 597H)." 
The court criticised the idea that insolvent companies can be released back 
into business after a compromise. 
At 114A the court stated: 
"With the greatest respect to my learned Colleague, I persist in the view that, 
according to our law, when a company has lost 75% of its capital, it is liable 
to be wound up in terms of Section 344(e) of the Companies Act; that when 
it has lost 100% of its capital and more, so that its liabilities exceed its assets, 
it has become insolvent and remains liable to be wound up; and that such a 
company can never demonstrate its solvency, nor resist winding up, by 
squandering its remaining assets or such moneys as it may manage to 
borrow in payment of current debts, to the prejudice of creditors whose 
claims have not yet fallen due for payment and trade creditors whose claims 
have not yet fallen due for payment and trade creditors who continue to be 
asked to provide goods and services on credit. 
For these reasons I find myself unable to accept the applicants' suggestion 
that Carbon Developments, the liabilities of which exceeded its assets at 30 
September 1988, was nevertheless solvent because it had not at that stage 
defaulted on current liabilities." 
Furthermore, the court expressed the opinion that these schemes should 
never be sanctioned where the company is insolvent. A similar attitude was 
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adopted by the Australian Courts in the 1970's 13• 
The second argument related to the subordination or back-ranking of certain 
clauses. It was argued by the applicant that all the fears about insolvency 
are irrelevant if the controller - creditor subordinates his debts in terms of a 
subordination agreement. In terms of this agreement all further debts would 
be preferred to his claim. 
The court criticised this solution on several grounds. At 115 Fit stated: 
"Far from suggesting, as Mr De Villiers does, that the subordination serves to 
restore the solvency of Carbon Development, the language of Note 10 to the 
financial statements, and the very step of subordinating certain claims to 
others, by implication proclaims the insolvency of Carbon Developments, for 
it is recognised that it will only be when the solvency of Carbon 
Developments has been restored (if it can ever be restored) that the situation 
may be dispensed with." 
More importantly the court pointed out that subordination contracts may be 
cancelled. Since the company is very often controlled by the subordinate 
creditor it is possible for him to cancel the agreement at any stage after he 
has left the court. Furthermore, since this is a type of stipulatio alteri, every 
future creditor has to find out about this agreement and accept the benefit 
under it, before he can be benefitted. 
The third major argument in the judgement related to the statutory declaration 
of liability: Section 424 ( 1) of Act 61 of 1973. 
It was suggested by the court that if these Section 311 schemes were 
sanctioned, any chance which the creditors had of holding the directors liable 
for acting fraudulently or negligently, would be destroyed. Since, once the 
creditors have settled under a compromise agreement, they are no longer 
creditors and as such have no claim under Section 424 or under the common 
law. 
13 see Re Data Homes (Pty) Ltd (1971 1 NSWLR 38) 
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The question of the efficacy of subordination agreements was finally settled 
by the Appellate Division in Ex parte De Villiers and another NNO: In re 
Carbon Developments (Ply) Ltd (in liquidation/
4 
- an appeal against the 
judgement of Stegmann J (discussed earlier). 
The Appellate Division held conclusively that the solvency of the company 
could be satisfied by subordination. This step helped in keeping the way 
open for the beneficial utilization of assessed losses of companies. However, 
a further aspect of subordination that has to be examined is the effect of 
Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act. This aspect will be discussed 
separately later. 
The acceptance of the principle of subordination in the Cooper v A & G 
Fashions case15 in the Cape Provincial Division had important consequences 
for the development of the Standard Scheme in this region. It allowed for the 
development of what became known as the "Excluded Creditor Scheme". 
The Excluded Creditor Scheme was yet another attempt by proposers of 
Schemes of Arrangement to obtain the protection afforded by Section 311 
without reducing the assessed loss of the company materially. 
In the Excluded Creditor Scheme, the offerer enters into an agreement with 
the company's major creditors (in value) to acquire their claims for a dividend 
which is slightly better than that obtainable on liquidation of the company. 
A Scheme is then proposed with the remaining creditors (who, whilst they 
invariably are the majority in number, represent a small portion of the 
creditors' claims in value). Because the remaining creditors' claims have a 
small aggregate value the reduction of the assessed loss under Section 20 
(1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act is small. 
However, the limitation on this type of scheme is that it can only work where 
the major claims against the company are held by a few creditors (the 
14 1993 (1) SA 493 (A) 
15 1991 (4) SA 204 (C) 
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"Excluded Creditors") with whom agreements separate to the scheme of 
arrangement can be concluded. 
In terms of the scheme of arrangement, the remaining creditors receive a 
dividend from the advance paid by the offerer. Upon payment of this 
dividend, the balance of their claims are extinguished (and not ceded to the 
offerer). The courts have held that this constitutes a genuine compromise 
between the company and its creditors or class of creditors. 
Finally, the scheme consideration paid by the offerer as well as the monies 
paid to acquire the claims of the excluded creditors are invariably 
subordinated in favour of future creditors. The subordination is made binding 
and effective by following the principles referred to in the A & G Fashions 
case. 
The Excluded Creditor Scheme has a number of inhibiting features which can 
make it difficult, time consuming and expensive to implement. 
Firstly, the target company must satisfy the basic requirement that the 
excluded creditors should be few in number, but constitute the significant 
majority in value. This is important for ease of negotiations as well as 
preservation of the assessed loss. 
Secondly, this type of scheme necessitates separate negotiations with each 
of the excluded creditors. Not only is this time consuming, but it is also made 
more difficult when the excluded creditors realise that their claims are 
essential to the offerer and that they can therefore hold the offerer to ransom. 
In practise this type of scheme requires the excluded creditors to have some 
kind of vested interest in seeing the scheme work (like on-going business 
with the company) otherwise they refuse to co-operate at viable levels for the 
offerer. 
Thirdly, the excluded creditors sometimes insist on being paid for and ceding 
their claims regardless of whether the scheme is sanctioned or not. It is 
obviously vital to the offerer that cession and payment be made conditional 
upon sanction of the scheme. 
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Finally, the scheme creditors are often reluctant to sanction the scheme 
because the excluded creditors are receiving preferential treatment. 
As a result of these difficulties the proposers of Schemes of Arrangement 
came up with what became known as the "New Cape Scheme". This has 
been considered and accepted by the Cape Provincial Division in an 
unreported decision. 
This type of scheme is discussed by Getz & Jooste in an article titled "Section 
311 of the Companies Act: Preserving the Assessed Loss"16 
"In terms of the New Cape Scheme, the offeror provides the company (by 
way of a loan) with a monetary amount ('the capital sum') to enable the 
company to make a dividend payment to its creditors subject to the 
conditions that should the scheme be sanctioned then: 
a) the rights of creditors to receive payment of their claims would be limited to 
the right to claim payment of the dividend in terms of the provisions of the 
Scheme; 
b) no creditor would thereafter have any claim against the company (and the 
proposer and the receiver) for any further payment or consideration in 
respect of any claim; 
c) the outstanding balance of the claims of the creditors of the company would 
be deemed to have been ceded to the proposer who would be deemed to 
have purchased and acquired all such claims; 
d) the capital sum and the ceded claims acquired by the proposer would be 
subordinated (as per the subordination provisions approved in Cooper vs A & 
G Fashions 17) 
The Cape Provincial Division sanctioned the scheme and found that it not 
only satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of Section 311, but also that the 
16 Getz K and Jooste R J : Revenue Law Jooste {ed) 56 
17 1991 (4) SA 204 (C) 
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deemed cession involved was not subject to the objections raised in the 
Robin18 and Multi-Bou 19 cases. The reasons advanced for this are as 
follows: 
I. In the New Cape Scheme the Company (and not as in the Standard Scheme, 
the offerer) pays dividends to the creditors 
II. The payment by the company to the creditors is not the purchase price paid 
by the offerer in acquiring the claims but is instead an actual reduction of the 
amount owed by the company to its creditors 
Ill. A simple part payment of the debt by the company would not as such 
constitute a scheme of arrangement. But the scheme involves much more 
than a simple part payment of a debt. In the New Cape Scheme, the 
creditors, in order to receive the part payments, have to accept a deemed 
cession of the balance of their claims. This deemed cession is not a 
separate transaction from the payment - the payment is conditional on 
agreeing to the cession. 
Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse lnkomste20 
In the Appellate Division the minority judgment of Van Heerden and Van den 
Heever JJA came out strongly in favour of the Standard Scheme and 
criticised the findings of Berman Jin the Multi-Bou21 case that an agreement 
by the creditors to reduce their claims against the Company by one cent in 
the Rand does not involve the company. The minority held that, apart from 
the statutory mechanism, the reduction of a creditor's claim against a 
company cannot be achieved without the company's co-operation. 
18 1987 (3) SA 413 (WLD) 
19 1987 (4) SA 405 (C) at 409 
20 1994 (2) SA 265 (A) 
21 1987 (4) SA 405 (C) 
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With reference to the judgement of Coetzee AJP in the Robin22 case, the 
minority agreed that the mere reduction provision does not automatically 
mean that the Standard Scheme has as its object an arrangement between a 
company and its creditors but held that such provision does in fact involve the 
company and must therefore be considered in the context of the other 
provisions of the Scheme. 
The reasoning of the minority was that whilst it is correct that one of the chief 
characteristics of the Standard Scheme is the Cession of the creditors claims 
to the offeror, the cession achieves nothing if the final liquidation order is 
granted. The other chief characteristic is thus the release of the company 
from liquidation and both the company and its creditors have an interest in 
achieving that. 
Because of the apparently passive role played by a company in liquidation for 
the purposes of Section 311 one loses sight of the legal consequences for 
the company which result from the confirmation of the arrangement. The 
apparently passive role played by the company is due largely to the fact that 
control of the company after provisional liquidation vests in the provisional 
liquidator, but the company still plays an active role in the Standard Scheme. 
The minority regarded the reduction of the claims by a nominal amount as 
unnecessary. Another significant aspect of the minority judgement is the 
catagoric rejection of the court's reasoning, in the Natal case relating to the 
'deemed' cession. 
Unfortunately, the majority judges in delivering their judgement found it 
unnecessary to make a pronouncement on the Standard Scheme. This is 
especially unfortunate as the minority's judgement cannot be binding on any 
court since a two judge Appellate Division decision cannot override a three 
judge decision in any local division. 
However, the majority did remark that Section 311 schemes are very valuable 
22 1987 (3) SA 413 (W) 
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and useful in the business world and with that in mind, our courts should not 
place too strict an interpretation on the provisions of the Section. They went 
on to hold that in order for a company to satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirements of Section 311 it is not necessary for the company's active role 
to be considerable. 
The final reason why the Namex decision is very important is its finding in 
relation to the question whether the Receiver of Revenue can be bound as a 
creditor by a scheme or arrangement under Section 311. It was held by the 
majority that whilst the Receiver of Revenue can be bound as a creditor 
under Section 311 this was only so in relation to claims which are known at 
the time of sanction. Any unknown claims could not be compromised. 
Summary 
Because of the Appellate Division decision in the Carbon Developments case 
which approved of subordination and the minority and majority decision in the 
Appellate Division in the Namex case which seems to hold out hope for the 
Standard Scheme together with the hybrid scheme in the form of the New 
Cape Scheme, it would seem that the obstacles raised by the Robin decision 
have been removed and schemes of arrangement in terms of Section 311 
are feasible, perhaps unaltered, but at the very least in one of the hybrid 
forms. 
However, the question of their feasibility cannot stop there. In addition one 
must examine the effect of the Income Tax and Value Added Tax Acts and 
these will now be looked at in more detail. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 
4.1 SECTION 20 (1) (a} OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 
Section 20 (1) provides that in order to determine the taxable income of a 
person carrying on a trade in the Republic, any balance of assessed loss 
included during any previous year which has been carried forward from the 
preceding year of assessment shall be set off against the income derived by 
the taxpayer from such trade. However, this is subject to the proviso 
contained in Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) which reads. 
"provided that the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount 
or value of any benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a 
concession granted by or a compromise made with his creditors whereby his 
liabilities to them have been reduced or extinguished, provided such liabilities 
arose in the ordinary course of trade." 
Bearing in mind that in many instances the motivation for the scheme of 
arrangement or offer of compromise in terms of Section 311 of the Act is the 
acquisition of the assessed loss of the company to utilize it for the tax 
advantages which attach to it, it becomes important to establish that the 
scheme is efficient from a tax perspective. 
The first important condition contained in Section 20 (1) is that the company 
carry on a trade. If the company, in any year of assessment, did not carry on 
a trade, it is not permitted to carry forward to that year an assessed loss from 
the immediately preceding year and it will lose forever its right to carry 
forward that assessed loss. Section 20 (1) (a) of the Income Tax Act 
envisages a continuity in setting off an assessed loss in each year 
succeeding the year in which it was originally incurred. Thus from year to 
year a balance can be ascertained and that balance will then be carried 
forward to each successive year until it is exhausted. 
It is not a requirement that the company must carry on a trade during the 
entire year of the assessment - any period of trading during the year in 
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question will suffice. However, it is not sufficient for the company to merely 
keep itself alive without trading. 
Indeed, it seems, however, that an assessed loss may be carried forward 
provided that the company trades even if such trade does not produce 
income (but on the further proviso that it carried on a trade with the intention 
to earn an income). 
Where a company in provisional liquidation has sold its business pending a 
scheme of arrangement or offer of compromise in terms of Section 311 of the 
Act, a danger exists if there is a delay in the sanction of the scheme which 
extends through a tax year. It may be found in these circumstances that the 
company has not traded for the purposes of it maintaining its assessed loss. 
An important case in this regard is Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd v CIR 23 
In this case an insolvent company had sold its business lock, stock and barrel 
except for certain stock which was stored in a bonded warehouse. The 
liquidators continued to sell off the stock after the business had been sold. 
The purchaser of the business undertook to make an offer of compromise in 
terms of Section 311 of the Act. The offer of compromise was to supercede 
the original sale and the provisional liquidation was then to be set aside. 
However, the court only sanctioned the scheme in the following tax year. The 
question then had to be determined whether the company had carried on a 
trade and was therefore able to carry forward its assessed loss: The only 
activity that had taken place was the sale of the goods in the bonded 
warehouse by the liquidators. 
The company contended that the sales of the goods were effected in the 
course of its trading activities and that it was therefore entitled to carry 
forward the assessed loss. 
The Commissioner on the other hand contended that the company had not 
carried on a trade during the relevant time and that in effecting the sales of 
23 1997 (2) All SA 195 {A) 
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goods in question, the liquidator was not carrying on a trade but was merely 
realising assets of the company in the course of liquidation. 
The court held that there had been no trading in the ordinary sense since 
whilst it may have been in the normal course of trading for a liquidator to sell 
off assets in bulk, trade and realisation are different and sometimes opposed 
concepts. It went on to hold that in this instance, the transactions did not 
constitute the carrying on of a trade and the company was therefore 
prohibited from carrying forward its assessed loss. The second important 
condition is set out in the proviso contained in Section 20 (1) (a) (ii). In terms 
of the proviso, the balance of an assessed loss must be reduced by the 
amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to any person 
resulting from a concession granted by or a compromise made with his 
creditors in terms whereof his liabilities are reduced or extinguished. 
From the working of this proviso it is clear that in order to be tax efficient, any 
acquirer of a company for its assessed loss would have to minimise the 
amount or benefit of any compromise in order to preserve as much as 
possible of the company's assessed loss. 
For many years the Standard Scheme was ideal in this regard since it not 
only satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of Section 311 of the Act, but also 
was tax effective (from the perspective of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii)) in that the 
compromise with the creditors resulted in an insignificant reduction in the 
assessed loss of the company. 
The Robin 24 and Multi-Bou 25 judgements left proposers of schemes of 
arrangement with a new challenge - to come up with a scheme that not only 
satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of Section 311 but also was tax 
efficient from the perspective of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
24 1987 (3) SA 413 (W) 
25 1987 (4) SA 405 (C) 
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The tax efficiency of the Preference Share Scheme: 
Proposers of the "Preference Share Schemes" argue that Section 20 does 
not apply to the schemes as the liability to repay a debt of a certain amount to 
creditors has been replaced with a liability to redeem preference shares at a 
value equal to the amount of the debt. Thus although the form of the liability 
has changed, the amount has stayed the same and the company has 
therefore not derived a benefit from the scheme sufficient to reduce the 
assessed loss. 
However, commentators on Preference Share Schemes (as opposed to 
Redeemable Preference Share Schemes) seem to be unanimous in their 
view that the company would under this type of scheme derive a clearly 
defined benefit26. 
The February 1989 Taxpayer 27 contains the most detailed analysis of the 
requirements of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) as well as a lengthy discussion of the 
tax implications of Preference Share Schemes. The requirements of Section 
20 (1) (a) (ii) have to all be present before an assessed loss is reduced. 
These are cited as the following. 
a) the amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to the company 
b) resulting from a concession granted by or a compromise made with the 
company's creditors 
c) whereby its liabilities to them have been reduced or extinguished. 
As far as requirement a) is concerned, it is submitted by the Taxpayer that 
26 See Jooste R J Schemes of Arrangement - A new development 28 Income Tax Reporter 
(1989)7 (based on the incorrect assumption that the Boltstone Case concerned 
preference shares) 
and The Taxpayer Vol. 38 (2) (February 1989) 
and Getz K and Jooste R J - Section 311 of the Companies Act: Preserving the Assessed 
Loss Acta Juridica ( 1995) 
27 see note 24 above 
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the benefit does accrue to the company since prior to the sanction of the 
scheme by the court the company does owe certain debts which are due and 
payable to its creditors. However, after sanction, there are no debts due and 
payable by the company. 
With regard to requirement b), this is more difficult to adjudicate on. 
However, The Taxpayer suggests that a persuasive approach is to examine 
the quid pro quo to which the creditors become entitled in settlement of their 
claims. If it is adequate then there is no concession - if not adequate then a 
concession must have been granted. 
The Australian Case of Grant V Federal Commissioner of Taxation28 is 
discussed in detail. In this case, the taxpayer paid $97 000 for the allotment 
of 97 000 preference shares with a par value of $1 each, but the court valued 
these preference shares at $39 770. The majority of the court held that the 
quid pro quo received by the taxpayer for the $97 000 spent, i.e. the 97 000 
shares, had to be valued with reference to their market value of $37 770 
notwithstanding the fact that in terms of company law it was not possible to 
pay less than $97 000 for the allotment of 97 000 $1 par value preference 
shares. The taxpayer was thus held liable for gift duty on the difference 
between the amount paid and the market value of the shares allotted. 
In the minority judgement in the same case it was held that as the lawful 
minimum had been paid for the preference shares the allotment received was 
a full consideration for the money paid and there was no liability for gift duty. 
The Taxpayer considered the aforesaid situation to be directly analogous to 
the question whether a compromise or concession has been granted where 
creditors receive par value preference shares for the face value of their 
claims. It is argued that whilst on the one hand if the share to which former 
creditors become entitled have a market value of less than the amount of the 
claim, then a concession would seem to have been granted. On the other 
28 7 ATR 1 
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hand a South African court may adopt the approach of the minority 
judgement that since the lawful minimum has been paid for the par value 
preference shares no concession or compromise can objectively be said to 
be present 
The Taxpayer inclines towards the majority view that the market value of the 
shares ought to be definitive. They cite the local case of Lace Proprietary 
Mines Ltd. V Commissioner for Inland Revenue29 in favour of this approach. 
In the aforesaid case the court held that the taxpayer received 1 million 
shares as a consideration and that the shares had to be valued according to 
their market value. 
The Taxpayer goes on to state that if the market value of the shares is less 
than the amount of the claims it is likely that it will be found that a concession 
has been granted. 
With regard to the third requirement, The Taxpayer points out that there can 
be no doubt that the company's liabilities to its former creditors have been 
extinguished. 
The Taxpayer therefore concludes that on their analysis of the requirements, 
the company may well lose a substantial portion of its assessed loss by 
adopting the Preference Share Scheme, rendering the Preference Share 
Scheme ineffective from a tax point of view. 
Because of the problems associated with Preference Share Schemes the 
proposers of schemes tended to favour the issue of redeemable preference 
shares rather than preference shares. As an extra caution, the amount of the 
redemption was made equal to the issued price of the shares and the 
obligation to redeem was made actual and not contingent. It was felt that 
these steps reduced the likelihood of the reduction of the assessed loss. 
However, in ITC 1613 the court considered a scheme of arrangement in 
terms of Section 311 where redeemable preference shares were issued and 
29 1938 AD 267 
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the court had to decide whether the Commissioner for Inland Revenue was 
entitled to reduce the balance of the assessed loss in terms of Section 20 ( 1) 
(a) (ii). 
The facts in ITC1613 were as follows. 30 
"The company (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) had been placed in 
final liquidation on 15 August 1989. 
A company, D Ltd. had proposed a scheme of arrangement between the 
Appellant and its creditors in terms of Section 311 of the Act and the scheme 
was confirmed by the court on 23 January1990. 
Features of the scheme of arrangement were that Appellant had been 
discharged from liquidation, D Ltd. acquired the existing share capital of the 
Appellant, Appellants liquidators were appointed as receivers for its creditors 
to give effect to the scheme and D undertook to provide capital to Appellant 
by subscribing for shares at an allotment price equal to the capital sum. 
The capital sum, the net proceeds of the excluded assets and interest on 
these amounts were to be applied by the receivers in paying the 
administration expenses, fees and disbursements of the liquidators and the 
receivers, the fees of the Master of the Supreme Court, the net amount due 
to secured creditors, the claims or preferent creditors and the balance 
remaining to be distributed among the concurrent creditors on a pro rata 
basis as if payment towards the concurrent claims against the company. 
In consideration for the right of creditors to receive the envisaged amounts 
and with effect from the effective date the claims of all creditors against the 
company reduced by their awards in terms of the arrangement were to be 
capitalised by the company on the basis of creating and allotting to a 
nominee of the company, being the proposer, a number of redeemable 
preference shares in the company as will have an aggregate issue value, 
including premium, equal to the face value of the claims, and these shares 
30 Quoted from South African Tax Cases Reports p188ft 
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were to be subject to the same rights as the existing issued ordinary share 
capital of the company. 
In the event the concurrent creditors received a dividend of 43, 48 cents in 
the Rand and, in effect, this meant that each concurrent creditor received for 
56, 52 cents of each Rand which had been owing, the right to a redeemable 
preference share at an allotment price of 56,52 cents. 
In fact, for each 100 cents of the claims not paid in cash the creditors were 
entitled to a share with a nominal value of 1 cent, issued at a premium of 99 
cents. They were redeemable at the full issue price of 100 cents and carried 
a 'coupon rate', presumably on the issue-price, of 10% per annum. 
The terms of the preference shares were not established in the evidence or in 
the dossier but they were redeemable and preferent. 
Appellant's financial statements revealed that for the nine month period 
ended 31 March 1990, 100 additional ordinary shares were issued at an 
allotment price of R5 736 100, while 18 997 499 cumulative redeemable 
preference shares were issued at an allotment price of R 18 997 499, the 
nominal value was R 189 975 and the share premium account was credited 
with R 18 807 524. 
Appellant had carried forward from previous years of assessment an 
assessed loss of R 8 540 219 in terms of Section 20 ( 1) (a) of the Income 
Tax Act and its net deductible expenditure, i.e. tax loss, for the nine month 
period was R 15 090 168 so that it sought to carry forward to the foilowing 
year, ending 31 March 1991, an assessed loss of R 23 630 387 in terms of 
Section 20 (1) (a). 
The Commissioner for Inland Revenue, acting in terms of Section 20(1) (a) 
(ii) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, reduced the balance of assessed loss 
by R 18 807 524 which was the amount credited to Appellant's share 
premium account on the issue of the preference shares. 
The crisp issue for determination was whether the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue was entitled to reduce the balance of assessed loss in the way that 
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he had. 
The Court held that in order to succeed, the Appellant had to establish the 
absence of one of more of the following: 
I 
a) a concession granted by or a compromise with Appellant's creditors and / or 
b) the receipt by or accrual to the Appellant of a benefit resulting therefrom. 
In addition, if the Appellant failed to establish that one or more of these 
· requirements was absent, the Appellant would still succeed in its appeal if the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue failed to establish the amount or value of 
the benefit which the Appellant received. 
The Court held further that there can be no doubt that the Appellant's 
creditors had agreed, by means of the scheme, to receive less than the face 
value of their claims - it held that it is true that if they had taken action to 
enforce the payment of their claims, they would not have been paid in full and 
that was obviously the reality which induced them to agree to accept, in part 
payment of their claims, shares of a value for lower than the face value of 
those claims and this could only be described as a concession, if not a 
compromise. 
It held that the very fact that section 311 had been invoked in order to 
facilitate what was called an arrangement which, in casu, would have 
required a re-arrangement of the creditors' rights to which their actual or 
imposed agreement was required, indicates a concession by them. 
With regards to a benefit derived, the court held that there was no doubt that 
the Appellant derived the benefit from the scheme of arrangement. 
Furthermore the benefit was received by the Appellant and was not received 
by nor did it accrue to anyone else, apart for the acquirer in the scheme 
indirectly, as the shareholder of the appellant. 
The court held that it was difficult, if at all possible, to quantify or place a 
value on the benefit derived by the Appellant from the scheme of 
arrangement. The only way to quantify the benefit was if the value of the 
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benefit was equivalent to the value of the claims. If a creditor forgoes a part 
of its claim against a company, the amount abandoned is the amount of the 
benefit but where a creditor accepts as a substitute for a part of its claim, a 
stake in the company's capital, it is not immediately clear whether this is a 
benefit. 
To establish the amount of a benefit the benefit must have an ascertainable 
money value and this obviously also applies to a benefit in the form of a 
saving from an expenditure. 
Thus the court held that whilst the redeemable Preference Share Scheme 
under discussion clearly amounted to a concession with Appellant's creditors 
and further amounted to a receipt by or accrual to the Appellant of a benefit 
resulting therefrom, the Appellant must succeed in its appeal since on the 
evidence before it there was no way that the court could quantify, in monetary 
terms, the benefit that accrued to the appellant by reason of the conversion 
of trade debt into shares without a prescribed formula or deeming provision in 
the Income Tax Act. 
Thus it would seem that, provided the Commissioner is able to place 
sufficient evidence before the court in Preference Share Schemes, these will 
fall foul of section 20 (1) (a) (ii) and will lose entirely their efficiency from a tax 
point of view. 
The Impact of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) on Subordination of Claims 
The principle of subordination has been accepted in the Carbon 
Developments case. 31 The question however arises whether the 
subordination triggers off the reduction of the assessed loss in terms of 
section 20 (1) (a) (ii). In other words does a subordination of creditors claims 
against a company in favour of future creditors give rise to the. receipt by or 
31 Ex Parte De Villiers and another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 
1993 (1) 
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an accrual to the company of a benefit arising from a concession granted by 
or a compromise made with the company's creditors whereby its liabilities to 
them have been reduced or extinguished? 
Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) can only apply if all the requirements for it to operate have 
been satisfied. If interest at a market related rate is charged in return for 
agreeing to subordinate the ceded claims then, even though the company 
has benefited by receiving an extension of time within which to pay the 
claims, the liabilities have not been reduced or extinguished and Section 
20(1)(a)(ii) is not applicable. If no interest is charged then the company will 
have benefitted from the extension and it may be shown to have had its 
liabilities reduced in that on subordination the company's liability is not to pay 
the face value of the ceded claims but the present value of the claims at an 
uncertain future date. 
The safest route to follow would be for interest to be charged at a market 
related rate on the subordinated claims. One could even provide for the 
interest to also be subordinated._lf this route is followed it is likely that 
subordination will be found to be tax efficient from the perspective of Section 
20 (1) (a) (ii). 
The Impact of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) on Excluded Creditor Schemes 
The Excluded Creditor Scheme is tax efficient from the perspective of Section 
20(1 )(a)(ii), in that the excluded creditors are few in number but constitute a 
significant majority in value and the scheme creditors (whose claims are 
compromised) represent a small minority in value. Thus the reduction in the 
assessed loss (as was the case with the Standard Scheme) is insignificant. 
The Impact of Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) on New Cape Schemes 
The New Cape Scheme is similarly tax efficient in that the assessed loss of 
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the Company is successfully preserved. 
Finally, by way of a closing remark on the impact of Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) of the 
Income Tax Act it should be noted that the minority judgement in the Namex 
case 32 has apparently opened the door again for the Standard Scheme 
without any of the alterations that changed it into its present day hybrid form. 
This being the case, it may happen in the not too distant future that the 
Standard Scheme with its efficiency from the Section 20 (1) (a) (ii) 
perspective will step into the spotlight and cause the other hybrid forms to 
fade into the background again. 
3.2 SECTION 103(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 
Companies wishing to utilize an assessed loss also face a potential hurdle in 
the form of the anti-avoidance provisions contained in Section 103(2). 
Section 103(2) is invoked by the Commissioner whenever he is satisfied 
firstly that any agreement affecting any company or any change in the 
shareholding in any company or in the members' interests in a close 
corporation has been entered into or effected at any time before or after the 
commencement of the Income Tax Act 55 of 1946 and secondly that it has 
been entered into or effected by any person solely or mainly for the purpose 
of utilizing any assessed loss or balance of an assessed loss incurred by the 
company to avoid liability on the part of that company or any other person for 
the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income, or to reduce its amount, and 
thirdly that income has been received by or has accrued to that company 
during any year or assessment as a direct or indirect result of that agreement 
or change in shareholding. 
The application of Section 103(2) results in the disallowance of the set-off of 
any such assessed loss or balance of assessed loss against any such 
income. 
32 1 1994(2)SA265(A) 
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The Appellate Division in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v Secretary 
for Inland Revenue 33, held that Section 103 was clearly directed at defeating 
tax avoidance schemes. It did not impose a tax or relate to the tax imposed 
by the Income Tax Act or to the liability for it or to its incidence, but to 
schemes for its avoidance. So it had to be interpreted to advance the 
remedy provided by the section and suppress the mischief against which it 
was directed. The Commissioner's powers were thus not to be restricted 
unnecessarily by interpretation. 
A common example of the type of mischief that Section 103(2) is designed to 
avoid is where there has been a diversion of income to the company or 
where the company, after a change of shareholding, earned income from 
activities which it had not undertaken prior to that. 
However, it is vitally important that Section 103(2) is inoperative, even where 
there has been an avoidance of tax liability, unless the avoidance of tax 
liability was the sole or main purpose of the agreement. 
Thus, if there was some sound business or commercial reason for the 
agreement, the fact that the assessed loss was also considered and taken 
into account (but merely as a subsidiary consideration) will not result in the 
application of section 103(2). The onus of proving that the sole or main 
purpose was not tax avoidance rests with the taxpayer. 
Examples of sound business or commercial reasons for the agreement would 
be the purchase of the company's assets, goodwill, trademarks, permits etc. 
One of the few instances where Section 103(2) would thus become a danger, 
in the context of schemes of arrangement, would be where the liquidator did 
not wait for a compromise offer under Section 311 and insisted on a separate 
offer being made for the assets of the company. In this instance, at the time 
of concluding a Section 311 arrangement, there would be no assets of any 
significance in the company except the assessed loss. The transaction 
33 1. 1975(4) SA715(A) 
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would thus have little or no normal commercial objective save for obtaining 
the tax benefit of utilizing the assessed loss and the compromise would be 
highly susceptible to an attack by Revenue under Section 103(2). 
In general though, provided there is a sound commercial or business reason 
for the scheme, there is little danger posed by Section 103(2). 
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4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT 
4.1 SECTION 22 (1) OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT 
The Value Added Tax Act 34("the VAT Act") provides that where a vendor has 
made a taxable supply (that is, a supply which is subject to Value Added Tax 
("VAT") for a consideration in money, and has paid the output tax on the 
supply, then if he has written off part or all of the consideration (i.e. the debt) 
as has become irrecoverable, he may claim an input tax deduction, in terms 
of Section 16(3) of the VAT Act, based on the portion written off. 
However, as from 4 July 1997, Section 22 of the VAT Act was amended by 
the introduction of Section 22(1 )(c)(iv). 
Section 22(1 )(c)(iv) reads as follows: 
"(iv) a vendor who has transferred an account recoverable at face value on a 
(aa) non.;recourse basis to any other person, shall not make any deduction in 
respect of such transfer in terms of this subsection; or (bb) recourse basis to 
any other person, may make a deduction in terms of this subsection only 
when such account receivable is transferred back to him and he has written 
off so much of the consideration as has become irrecoverable". 
The explanatory memorandum issued by The Receiver of Revenue stipulates 
that the amendments to Section 22(1) were intended to apply to factoring 
arrangements. However, it would seem that they may well directly impact on 
trade creditors of a target company. 
Before the introduction of the amendment where a trade debt was ceded at a 
value which was a discount to the face value, the discount was in practice 
treated as irrecoverable by the ceding vendor and a VAT input (equal to the 
tax fraction) was allowed by the Receiver of Revenue. 
34 No 89 of 1991 
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Since the amendment however, the input tax deduction is denied to any 
vendor for his loss if he has transferred the trade debt on a non-recourse 
basis at face value. 
Bennett and Kruger in the August 1997 VATGRAM35, criticise the 
amendment as follows: 
'It has been the practice since the introduction of VAT to allow vendors to 
claim input tax relief where they write off any consideration in respect of 
which they have accounted for output tax as irrecoverable. It did not matter 
whether the amount was written off as irrecoverable by virtue of the debtor 
not being in a position to pay it, or merely because the debt was factored. In 
a surprise move, Section 22 has been amended to deny a vendor a 
deduction where a debt is disposed of at face value on a non-recourse basis. 
The rationale for the change according to the Explanatory Memorandum is 
that in this instance the "factoring cost" is not part of the consideration for the 
underlying supply which has been written off as irrecoverable, rather it is the 
cost of earning the "factoring income". The Memorandum notes the transfer 
of a debt security. With respect, while the "factoring cost" does indeed 
constitute consideration for an exempt supply in the hands of the person 
factoring the debt, the fact of the matter is that the vendor will not recover that 
part of the consideration in respect of which he has accounted for output tax 
(which he effectively collects on behalf of the Fisc). He should in our view still 
be entitled to input tax relief. 
By contrast, where the vendor disposes of his debts on a recourse basis, he 
is similarly denied a deduction until the debt is returned to him, if ever, and he 
writes the debt off as irrecoverable. We see no reason for restricting the 
deduction in this manner. It must be borne in mind that while the vendor will 
be denied any VAT relief where he factors his trade debts (unless the debts 
have been factored on a recourse basis and are then irrecoverable), he is 
35 VATGRAM (1997) 3 Butterworths - Bennett, A and Kruger, D {eds) 
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nevertheless entitled to income tax relief in respect of the VAT portion of the 
"factoring cost".' 
Section 22 has been further amended by the provisions of 22(1A) which 
reads as follows: 
'(1A) Where a vendor-
(a) has made a taxable supply for consideration in money; and 
(b) has furnished a return in respect of the tax period for which the output 
tax on the supply was payable (at the rate of tax referred to in section 7 
(1) and has properly accounted for the output tax on that supply as 
required in terms of this Act; and 
(c) has transferred the account receivable relating to such taxable supply at 
face value to another vendor (hereinafter referred to as the recipient) on 
a non-recourse basis on or after the date of promulgation of the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1997, 
and any amount of the face value (excluding any amount of finance charges 
or collection costs) of such account receivable has been written off as 
irrecoverable by such recipient, such recipient may make a deduction in 
terms of section 16 (3) of an amount equal to the tax fraction (being the tax 
fraction applicable at the time such taxable supply is deemed to have been 
made) of such face value (limited to the amount paid by the recipient in 
respect of such face value) written off by him, the deduction so made being 
deemed for the purposes of the said section to be input tax.' 
Bennett and Kruger36 criticize this amendment as follows: 
"The situation becomes even more unbelievable. Section 22 has been further 
amended to allow the person to whom a debt has been factored on a non-
36 VATGRAM 1997(3)(Butterworths) 
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recourse basis to claim VAT relief if he is in effect unable to recover the full 
face value of the debt, limited to the amount paid by him for the debt. Why? 
As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum the factoring of debts constitutes 
an exempt supply and the consideration received by the person factoring the 
debt (in effect the difference between the face value of the debt and the 
consideration paid for it) does not attract any VAT liability. If then part of the 
consideration for the exempt supply is irrecoverable, why is input tax relief 
being granted to someone other than the person who bore the burden of the 
tax in the first place? 
The difficulty with the amendments to the VAT Act seems to be that although 
they were aimed at factoring arrangements, their wording is wide enough for 
them to apply to schemes of arrangement in terms of Section 311. In the 
situation where a trade creditor in terms of a scheme in terms of Section 311 
cedes his claims at face value to the proposer on a non recourse basis and 
realises a loss, the scheme creditor would forfeit the input credit which he 
would have been entitled to, had he simply written of the debt as bad. 
Thus the Scheme would be unattractive to trade creditors unless the offerer 
included in the dividend to creditors, an amount equivalent to the input credit 
cost by the creditors. 
This generally poses a problem to offerers as it will make the scheme not 
viable from a commercial point of view. 
In addition it would be a problem for the liquidator to propose to the body of 
creditors that they would be in a better position accepting the scheme of 
arrangement since by virtue of the amendments to 22(i) they would clearly 
be worse off to the tune of the VAT input. 
4.2 SECTION 22(3) OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT: 
Section 22(3) was inserted into the VAT Act in July 1996. The provides as 
follows: 
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"(3) Where a vendor who is required to account for tax payable on an invoice 
basis in terms of section 15 -
(a) has made a deduction of input tax in terms of section 16(3) in 
respect of a taxable supply of goods of services made to him; and 
(b) has, within a period of 36 months after the expiry date of the tax 
period within which such deduction was made, not paid the full 
consideration in respect of such supply, 
an amount equal to the tax fraction, as applicable at the time of such 
deduction, of that portion of the consideration which has not been paid shall 
be deemed to be tax charged in respect of a taxable supply made in the next 
following tax period after the expiry of the period of 12 months: Provided that 
the period of 12 months shall, if any contract in writing in terms of which such 
supply was made provides for the payment of consideration or any portion 
thereof to take place after the expiry of the tax period within which such 
deduction was made, in respect of such consideration or portion be 
calculated as from the end of the month within which such consideration or 
portion was payable in terms of that contract. 
[Sub-s (3) added bys. 25 of Act No. 37 of 1996 and amended by s. 36 (C) of 
Act No. 27 of 1997.]" 
Thus, the Section provides that the recipient of a taxable supply who has 
claimed an input tax deduction in relation thereto must account for output tax 
(equal to the tax fraction of the outstanding amount) if payment for that 
supply has not been made within 36 months. So if the debt is not paid there 
is a recoupment of the VAT input. 
In terms of an amendment to this provision, effective from June 1997, the 36 
month period was reduced to 12 months. However, because of an oversight 
in the amendment, the 36 month period was not altered to 12 months in 
paragraph (b) of Section 22(3). 
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As a result there was some confusion which was eventually settled by a 
media release37 by the South African Revenue Services which stated that the 
36 month period will continue to apply until the amendment is corrected in 
1998 to reflect a 12 month period (probably in July 1998). 
The effect of this is basically that in cases of companies in provisional 
liquidation (which in most instances would be unable to settle their creditor's 
claims during the required period) these companies would become liable to 
pay output tax in respect of these claims. 
The danger to unsuspecting offerors who acquire debt-laden companies 
would be substantial - they would suddenly find themselves facing 
considerable hidden VAT liabilities. 
The Receiver of Revenue obviously saw that there was a problem with their 
VAT collections where taxable supplies were made but never paid for. The 
logic seems to be that the supplier of goods and services would pay output 
VAT and that after failing to obtain payment for the supply, the debt_would be 
written off as a bad debt and the VAT would be reclaimed. The recipient of 
the supply would claim input VAT when the supply was made but there was 
no mechanism for the recovery of that input VAT when the payment for that' 
supply was never made. 
This section obviously poses a huge danger to offerors in schemes of 
arrangement in terms of Section 311 . 
It would, in these circumstances be essential for the offeror in terms of a 
scheme and prior to the approval of the scheme, to approach the Receiver of 
Revenue to reach an agreed amount to be paid in respect of all of its existing 
and potential claims in the event of a sanction of the compromise. 
In order to achieve this the Scheme must either be made conditional on the 
offeror being able to reach an agreement with the Receiver of Revenue 
whereby the Receiver of Revenue waives all of its Section 22(3) claims for an 
37 Number 10 of 1997 
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agreed consideration or, a separate class of creditor must be created for the 
Receiver of Revenue (in respect of its concurrent claim in terms of Section 
22(3). The former route is probably preferable. 
The question now arises whether the Receiver of Revenue may in fact agree 
to the compromise of its claim. 
It would seem that the Receiver of Revenue's claim for VAT is not just a 
straight forward preferent claim 
It is true that 99(1 )(cD) of the Insolvency Act does confer a preference on the 
Receiver of Revenue (pari passu with certain other claims) out of the balance 
of the free residue in respect of VAT, interest and penalties due by the 
insolvent immediately prior to the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent, 
which, by the application of 340 of the Companies Act corresponds to the 
winding up of a Company. 
However, the complicating factor would appear to be the wording of Section 
22(3). It seems that the supplier and the recipient may agree at any time, 
prior to the lapse of the stipulated period, to an extension of time within which 
the consideration must be paid. 
Whether or not the Receiver of Revenue would regard this practice as 
applicable in the case of liquidation, it appears that the Receiver of 
Revenue's claim for output tax is at least contingent on the lapse of the 
stipulated time. 
Thus there are three categories of claims by the Receiver of Revenue. 
a) claims not contingent at the date of winding up - which confer a 
preference on the free residue. 
b) Claims no longer contingent at the acceptance of the offer of 
compromise - which will have no preference. 
c) Contingent claims at the date of acceptance of the offer of compromise. 
It is the last category of claim which causes the most problems as they are 
not only contingent but also unliquidated. 
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When attempting to get agreement from the Receiver of Revenue, a question 
arises in relation to these claims as to whether the Receiver of Revenue can 
be bound by his agreement. 
In this regard the Namex case 38 sets out fully the powers of the Receiver of 
Revenue to agree to an offer of compromise. 
The court held that the Commissioner could consent in respect of a known 
tax claim where the arrangement was for the benefit of the state. 
Thus the Commissioner's claim for output tax, to the extent that it is known at 
the date of the creditors' meeting may form part of the arrangement to which 
the commissioner is entitled to agree. 
The court went on to provide that if it is unknown whether the company has a 
further tax liability one could very seldom decide whether the waiver of a 
possible existing but unknown claim for tax would be to the advantage of the 
State or whether the unknown claim to which the waivers refers was 
irrecoverable. 
The court in Namex seemed to envisage a waiver of an unknown claim and 
thus did not hold that the Commissioner cannot consent where a claim can 
be quantified. 
Thus it seems that (provided that the offerer had sufficient information to 
make it feasible ) it would be competent for the offerer to approach the 
Commissioner to agree to a compromise which would include a quantification 
of his claim that may arise in the future in respect of VAT. 
In summary, a new danger has been posed to offerers in schemes of 
arrangement. It must be assumed that the gremlin in Section 22(3) will be 
38 Namex v CIR 1994(2)SA265(A) 
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removed in July 1998 and that the operative period will then be 12 months. 
Offerors must obviously approach the Commissioner for Inland Revenue in 
an attempt to compromise his claim. However, at this stage it must be borne 
in mind that the issue of whether it is competent for the commissioner to 
compromise his claim in these circumstances, has not come before the court 
to be decided. 
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5. CONCLUSION: 
Schemes of arrangement and offers of compromise in terms of Section 311 
have weathered the storm in so far as the challenges posed by the varying 
judgements of the different divisions of the High Court. 
There seems to be hope offered by the Minority judgement in Namex that the 
door might again open for the Standard Scheme and the challenges posed 
by the Income Tax Act, Sections 103(2) and especially Section 20(1) may be 
overcome as a result of Namex. Even ITC1613 may offer some hope as it 
makes it clear that the difficulty of quantification of the benefit enjoyed still 
poses a problem for the Commissioner for Inland Revenue. 
However, it would seem that the biggest challenge to schemes of 
arrangement and offers of compromise has been posed by The Value Added 
Tax Act. Not only does Section 22(1) cause problems by making the claims 
of trade creditors impractically expensive for the offeror in cases of 
companies with large numbers of trade creditors but Section 22(3) also poses 
problems for offerors, which although they may not be insurmountable, have 
as yet not had the possible solutions tested. 
I have no doubt, having examined the history of the development of schemes 
of arrangement and offers of compromise, that proposers of the schemes 
and offers will not allow the challenges posed by the most recent 
amendments to the legislation to deter them for any length of time, and in the 
near future further variations will be introduced which will allow Section 311 to 
continue to play the beneficial and important role that it always has in the 
past. 
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